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Abstract—Cooperative Systems provide, through the multiplic-
ation of information sources over the road, a lot of poten-
tial to improve the assessment of the road risk describing
a particular driving situation. In this paper, we compare
the performance of a cooperative risk assessment approach
against a non-cooperative approach; we used an advanced
simulation framework, allowing for accurate and detailed, close-
to-reality simulations. Risk is estimated, in both cases, with
combinations of indicators based on the TTC. For the non-
cooperative approach, vehicles are equipped only with an AAC-
like forward-facing ranging sensor. On the other hand, for
the cooperative approach, vehicles share information through
802.11p IVC and create an augmented map representing their
environment; risk indicators are then extracted from this map.
Our system shows that the cooperative risk assessment provides
a systematic increase of forward warning to most of the vehicles
involved in a freeway emergency braking scenario, compared
to a non-cooperative system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative Systems (CS) are widely considered as the next
major step in driving assistance systems (ADAS), aiming
at increasing safety and comfort for drivers. Wireless Inter-
Vehicular Communications (IVC) are used to share inform-
ation so that drivers, or ADAS, can enhance their aware-
ness of their surroundings. The state of the vehicle or the
driver, detected objects and events pertaining to the driving
environment (ranging from traffic and weather information
to collision warning) are the type of information that can be
exchanged within Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs).
Enhancing awareness of the environment could be a major
boon to road safety; indeed, statistics show that crashes
are mostly driven by human error [1], [2], [3], and more
specifically perceptive errors, which account for about 50%
of crashes caused by human error [2]. Detecting and as-
sessing road risk is a major way to enhance the drivers’
perception of their environment, by providing them with
simple information they can use to adapt their behaviour.
Active replacement of the drivers in certain circumstance is
another way to tackle this problem, although ultimately such
systems must also be able to detect and assess risk in order
to successfully perform the task they are designed for.
Many non-cooperative applications also aim at reducing per-
ceptive errors by drivers, notably by increasing the number
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of sensors embedded on vehicles. Accordingly, we believe
it is required to demonstrate whether CS applications can
be more efficient than their non-cooperative equivalents to
detect and evaluate risky driving situations, especially in
some non-complex driving scenarios.
This papers present a study that compares the performance
of cooperative and non-cooperative crash risk-assessment,
specifically regarding the advance warning time that can
be provide to drivers using either methods. Our study was
undertaken within an advanced CS simulation framework [4]
in order to maximise the relevance of its results. Within this
architecture, an augmented perception system was built in
order to fuse information coming from different vehicles into
a single augmented map. This information is then used to
extract several risk indicators, describing the dangerousness
of the driving situation for each vehicles present in the
scenario, as well as collectively.
Our results suggest that, in a string of vehicles performing
an emergency braking manoeuvre, the augmented-map based
cooperative risk-assessment can offer from 2 to 7 seconds
of additional warning on top of the average 5 seconds of
warning provided by the non-cooperative risk-assessment.
A 5-vehicle string emergency breaking scenario was used to
compare the risk-assessment approaches’ performance. Our
results show that the local risk-assessment system can inform
drivers that they are entering "dangerous" driving conditions
with at most 5 seconds of warning before the actual crash.
On the other hand, the augmented-map based risk-assessment
gives an additional 2 to 7 seconds of advance warning, for
a total of almost 13 seconds of warning before the crash, in
the best case scenario (for the string’s last vehicle).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section
II presents the system’s architecture, focusing especially on
the augmented map building approach; Section III introduces
the emergency braking scenario that we implemented in our
simulation framework; Section IV presents the risk metrics
that we used in more details; Section V details the results
we obtained, regarding the quality of the risk assessment and
their usefulness for the drivers’ safety; eventually, we offer
conclusions and perspective on future works in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
A. Background
The augmented perception and risk assessment architecture is
set within the SiVIC-RTMaps™-based framework described
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Fig. 1: Overall system’s architecture
in [5], [6], [7], [4]. It is hosted on both software suites; how-
ever, most of the computing is performed within RTMaps™.
An upper-level illustration of the system’s architecture is
shown in Fig. 1. Each functional block’s location within the
framework and relationships with other blocks are shown.
SiVIC and RTMaps each host two blocks; SiVIC handles
the environment and IVC simulation, while RTMaps hosts
the blocks related to the CS simulation. Although it is shown
outside of the RTMaps block, the risk-assessment application
(in green) is actually also hosted within it. Most of the
architecture’s customisable parts are located within RTMaps
blocks.
The “IVC simulation” block is based on experimental meas-
urements described in [8], [9]; the generalist CS simulation
architecture and its relationships with SiVIC have been
covered in more details in [4], [9].
In the remainder of this section, we shall focus on the aug-
mented perception architecture which is used for this study.
It is tasked with created the augmented map. An augmented
map is a repository where any relevant information about
objects in the environment, and the environment itself, can
be stored in a layered architecture. In this paper, we limit
ourselves to a single information layer covering objects and
their behaviour within a certain area around the ego-vehicle.
The computation of risk metrics from information contained
in the augmented map is covered in Section IV.
B. Augmented perception architecture
In Fig. 2, we show the detailed view of the augmented
perception architecture, including its interaction with the
IVC simulation. The process to build an augmented map
is broken down in the three stages: (1) spatial and temporal
synchronisation, (2) association, and (3) fusion. These stages
are shown respectively in yellow, green and purple in Fig.
2. The architecture is built for a decentralised map-building
approach, i.e. one where each vehicle computes its own
augmented map from local and remote data (although a
centralised map-building process would work along the same
principles).
1) Local map module: The local map modules are tasked
with building the vehicle’s local map. In the present system,
we assume the simple case where vehicles only have pos-
itioning sensors (typically a GPS). Proprioceptive informa-
tion, from an INS central for example, can be used to enhance
the vehicle’s localisation. The local map information is sent
to both the synchronisation and IVC modules; the former
will update it to the current timestamp, if necessary, so it
can be used to create the augmented map, while the latter
will format it appropriately and send it to other vehicles via
the 802.11p IVC simulation.
2) IVC module: The IVC module manages the exchange
of information between the vehicles, simulating the trans-
mission of messages through a transponder-like mechanism.
Messages are encoded at the byte-level as they would be in
real hardware, and two imperfections can be simulated: (1)
latency, and (2) frame loss. Further details can be found in
[8], [9].
3) Spatial and temporal synchronisation modules: The spa-
tial and temporal synchronisation modules perform three
distinct functions. A first module prepares incoming data to
create objects in a single standardised format, if they are not
already in this format. We used the following standardised
state-vector:
X = [ID, S,A, tmin, tmax, T, {X,Y, Z}LLA ,
{X,Y, Z}LAM , {VX , VY , VZ}LAM ,
σXX , σY Y , σXY , E, C,Occ]
where ID is the object’s unique identifier; S is a boolean
value used to described the object’s state; A is a boolean
value used to verify if the object is an augmented object; tmin
and tmax are timestamps used for internal delays’ computa-
tion; T is the object’s most recent timestamp in the common
temporal reference; {X,Y, Z}LLA and {X,Y, Z}LAM are
the object’s position within respectively WGS 84 and Lam-
bert conformal conic coordinate systems; {VX , VY , VZ}LAM
is the object’s speed along the three axis (in Lambert coordin-
ates); {σXX , σY Y , σXY } are the elements of the object’s
variance-covariance matrix; E is an error code value that
can be used to signal a problem with the object; C is the
confidence in the object’s existence; and Occ is the number
of occurrences for which the object has been detected and
tracked.
Then, the standardised objects are synchronised spatially
by being re-projected into a common coordinate system;
for example WGS 84 or Lambert coordinates. The default
coordinate system used in SiVIC is Lambert coordinates.
Eventually, the standardised objects are temporally synchron-
ised with the prediction step of a linear Kalman filter. The
objects’ behaviour is evaluated to a common timestamp
which is considered as the “present time” (all objects will
have the same value in field T ). This timestamp is set the
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Fig. 2: Detailed augmented map building architecture
instant data enters the component, and will not change in
any downstream component. It will also be used as the
augmented map’s timestamp.
4) Association & tracking module: The association and
tracking module receives synchronised remote and local
objects as well as the previously synchronised augmented
objects from the synchronisation module. Here, remote and
local objects are associated with previously known augmen-
ted objects, and if no match can be found, instructions are
given to create new augmented objects. The module also
manages the disappearance of objects.
The module is based upon the Multi-Hypothesis Tracking
(MHT) algorithm proposed in [10], [11], expanding on the
association “2-by-2” procedure using the Dempster-Shafer
Theory (also Belief Theory) [12], [13], [14], [15] as proposed
in [16]. The Dempster-Shafer Theory provides an interesting
formalism to manage and handle imprecision, uncertainty
and missing information. Instead of strictly considering prob-
ability distributions over a finite number of hypotheses, like
the majority of other approaches, belief functions are also
computed over all subsets of hypotheses. A larger frame of
discernment than the one used in probability is then con-
sidered, allowing a better modelisation of “doubt” when data
is insufficiently informative. This can be especially useful
given the highly changing and complex road environment
that can lead to significant imperfection in data.
The algorithm described in [10], [11] combines the advant-
ages of MHT (creation and destruction of objects) with a
very high level of accuracy concerning target disappearance,
allowing it to discriminate between objects that have disap-
peared for good (by moving away of the sensors’ range) or
being only temporarily invisible, because of occultations by
another object for example. This is achieved by solving is-
sues related to the maximum global belief criterion, allowing
it to avoid problematic local associations that can arise while
the global belief criterion is still satisfied.
5) Fusion module: The last module performs the fusion
of existing augmented objects with remote or local objects,
or the fusion of remote and local objects together to form
new augmented objects, following the instructions received
from the association and tracking module (in the form of an
association matrix).
This last component uses the update step of a linear Kalman
filter, which is looped so that augmented objects can be
updated with data from the remote and local objects which
are considered as new measurements within the Kalman
filter’s formalism. The module outputs the augmented objects
forming the augmented map, using the same standardised
state vectors as described earlier.
III. SCENARIO
The scenario which we implemented in SiVIC is the
“vehicles strings scenario”, also called “brick wall scenario”
[17]. It features a string of vehicles driving on a road,
typically a freeway. At some point, the string’s leader brakes
suddenly because of an incident, which then triggers a series
of rear-end crashes in reaction as the following vehicles
are progressively affected. One can describe a braking wave
propagating through the string, which is a specific form of the
kinematic wave described by [18]. In the brick wall version,
the leader is stopped instantaneously (or almost) as if it had
collided a static heavy obstacle, for an example, a collapsed
overpass. In the other, more likely version that we will
implement, the leader performs a sudden emergency braking
manoeuvre, still moving some distance before coming to a
complete stop.
A five-vehicle string (1 leader, 4 followers)1 is set up in
SiVIC, starting from grouped positions at one location on
the test track. From these start positions, the vehicles arrange
themselves in a string on the right-hand lane and progress-
ively speed up to 70 km/h. The vehicles are completely
homogeneous in terms of characteristics (mass, braking
capacity, etc.) and driver behaviour (reaction time th, allowed
interdistance tinter, etc.). In order to simulate a medium
1The number of vehicles in the string is limited by processing power.
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Fig. 3: Risk functions from two studies using TTC
density string where drivers drive according to classic safety
recommendations (i.e. maintaining at least 2 seconds of
intervehiculary time) we set tinter = 2.5 seconds. The
drivers’ reaction time is th = 0.5 second.
The lead vehicle performs an emergency braking manoeuvre
about 700 metres from the start position, in a straight section
of the track. Vehicles react according to the instructions
outputted by the controller described in [4]. We consider
two sub-scenarios in terms of CS equipment:
(1) No CS-equipped vehicles in the string. However, veh5
is fitted with a set of exteroceptive (laserscanner) and local-
isation sensors to build a map of its immediate environment;
this map is used to compute a risk indicator for the driving
situation relatively to veh5.
(2) All vehicles are CS-equipped, they broadcast their po-
sition to each other. All vehicles will build an augmented
map from local positioning data and the information received
from the other vehicles, for example, in veh5, an augmented
map is built from local data and information from veh1,...,4.
The maps are then used to compute a risk indicator for the
driving situation relative to ego-vehicle.
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT
In order to compare the interest of CS versus non-cooperative
systems in a risk assessment context, we need a unique risk
criterion or measurement metric. In this paper, we will use
the most common risk metric based on the Time to Collision
(TTC). The TTC is a projection of the time remaining
at time t before a future collision between two vehicles,
if they do not change their driving behaviour (which is
speed, acceleration or direction of driving). TTC is actually
a surrogate of risk; indeed, risk is usually considered as a
combination of the probability for an event to happen and of
the gravity of said event. The instantaneous crash risk is thus
the probability of crash multiplied by the expected severity
of said crash, if it were to occur.
The probability of crash can be computed from the TTC
through a function, such as from [19], [20] which are shown
in Fig. 3. In the case of [19], the crash probability is directly
indicative of risk; on the other hand, for [20] the probability
obtained from the TTC is then multiplied by a severity
value. The severity is obtained using the Equivalent Energy
Speed (EES) [11]. Indeed, when considering the collision
of two vehicles, the EES gives an indication of the kinetic
energy that was dissipated by the collision. This value is then
linked to probability of injuries experienced by the vehicle’s
occupant(s).
Let us have a string of n vehicles {veh1, . . . , vehn}, where
the ego-vehicle (the only one that can have exteroceptive
sensors) is vehn (note that even if we describe our system
from the point of view of vehn, it works the same on all
equiped vehicles).
The first step consists in computing relevant TTCs. The TTC
TTCn−1 with the immediately preceding vehicle (vehn−1)
is computed to represent a risk-assessment system based on a
mono-vehicle system. Simultaneously, we also evaluate risk
through the augmented map in order to easily compare the
outputs of the two systems, so the TTCs between the ego-
vehicle and all the known object {TTC1,n, . . . , TTCn−1,n}
are computed.
Once the relevant TTCs are known, we use function f from
[20]–Eq. (1)–to compute a crash probability Pi,n for each
vehicle i ∈ [1, n− 1] relative to the ego-vehicle vehn.
Then, the risks Ri,n for each vehicle relative to vehn can be
computed according to Eq. (2), where g is a function that
computes the severity of the potential crash using the EES
and G–Eq. (3)–which is the transfer function linking the EES
to the likelihood of injury or death. We consider only the
likelihood of severe injury or death, i.e. the most pessimistic
scenario. The EES is computed with Eq. (4), where for vehx,
Vx is its speed (at the impact, the same as used for the TTC if
nothing changes) and mx its mass. We then select the max-
imum between the two values computed with g to represent
two variations of the same crash: g (Vn, Vi) represents the
severity of a crash where the two involved vehicles have not
changed their speed compared to the current time; on the
other hand, g (Vn, Vi − γTTCi,n) represents the severity of
the crash that would happen if vehi was to perform a sudden
emergency braking manoeuvre with deceleration γ (γ w 0.8g
in our implementation). This latter approach is closer to the
actual conditions of the scenario.
Pi,n = f (TTCi,n) (1)
Ri,n = Pi,n ×max [g (Vn, Vi) , (2)
g (Vn, Vi − γTTCi,n)]
g (Vn, Vi) = G (eesi,n) (3)
eesi,n = (Vn − Vi) mi
mi +mn
(4)
In our test scenario, we have four objects, plus the ego-
vehicle from which the driving scene will be considered.
In our scenario we focus on the point of view of the last
vehicle vehn, where n = 5, so in the non-cooperative
application, we only have R4,5 since veh5 is only capable
of sensing veh4 which is in front of it, blocking the view to
the other vehicles. In the cooperative application, we have an
array of risks: {R1,5, R2,5, R3,5, R4,5}. Actually, in the co-
operative application each vehicle can compute similar arrays
so that we have for each vehx {Ri,x, . . . , Rn,x} where i ∈
[1, n] , i 6= x.
In order to compare the performance of the local risk
assessment to an augmented-perception based approach, it
is more appropriate to create a single risk value describing
the dangerousness of the driving situation as collectively
determined by all the present vehicles. There are actually
two such values. At first, we have the global risk Rg,x as
perceived by a single vehicle vehx. Then, the total global
risk pertaining to the driving situation as perceived by all
vehicles isRg; the higher Rg , the more dangerous the driving
situation.
Rg,x is computed according to Eq. (5) and provides a lower
boundary of the global risk perceived by that vehicle, in
relation to the other vehicles. Essentially, Rg,x is close to
the risk computed with local sensors only, as the closest
vehicle driven in front of the ego-vehicle is likely to pose
an immediate significant source of risk. However, the other
vehicles are also accounted for, which might be useful in
some driving scenarios.
Global risk Rg is computed with Eq. (6), as the average of
the “vehicle-centric” risks Rg,x. Rg represents the risk for
the whole driving situation, i.e. the total risk. Our approach
is similar but simpler than the average-based risk valued
computed in [21], as we do not weigh the risk values received
from other vehicles.
Rg,x ≥ max (Ri,x, . . . , Rn,x) (5)
where i ∈ [1, n] , i 6= x
Rg =
1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Rg,j (6)
V. RESULTS
We run our scenario with both the cooperative and non-
cooperative risk assessment processes active at the same
time. A dozen runs of the scenario were performed, but we
will focus on two runs, labelled #A and #B, chosen randomly
among the total runs. The following parameters are used:
• veh1, . . . , veh4 send their positioning data every 500
ms, with a latency of no more than 5 ms.
• veh5 updates its own position every 100 ms.
• veh5 creates a local map every 50 ms and an augmented
map every 100 ms.
Firstly, let us study the risk assessment performed with the
local map only. As mentioned before, only R4,5 is available
since veh5 is only capable of sensing veh4 with its front-
facing laserscanner. On Fig. 4a and 4b we show TTC4,5,
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Fig. 4: Local measurements of TTC, crash probability and
subsequent risk
TABLE I: Variations of dt over a few runs
twarning tA tL dt
47.29 51.94 58.85 6.91
57.27 60.55 67.82 7.27
50.0 53.52 59.86 6.34
97.45 101.05 108.28 7.23
96.77 99.93 107.2 7.27
379.85 383.05 390.66 7.61
P4,5 and R4,5, the time to collision, probability of collision
and risk computed for veh4, for runs #A and #B. In both
case, we noticed that the risk starts to increase after a plateau
of about 10 to 5 seconds before the crash; this corresponds
to a reduction of TTC4,5; TTC4,5 had previously remained
stable for half a dozen of seconds. TTC4,5 starts to decrease
as veh4 is pressing on its brakes and veh5 is still driving
toward it a full speed.
Let us have a threshold of Rx = 0.7 to say that the driving
situation is “dangerous”. With local perception only, the
driver will be warned about 5 seconds before the actual crash.
This is a short advance warning time, but it would be enough
for the driver to prepare for a dangerous event and initiate
some mitigation or avoidance manoeuvre.
Let us now consider the cooperative approach. On Fig. 5a
and Fig. 5b, we show the Rg,x, Rg (noted the augmented
risk) and R4,5 (noted the local risk) for runs #A and #B. In
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Fig. 5: Local and augmented risks measured during the two studies runs
both runs, at about the middle of the run, the local risk R4,5
rose above the 0.7 threshold while Rg remained under that
threshold. At that moment, veh5 assessed that it was in a
dangerous driving situation (TTC4,5 came to just 2 seconds,
as seen in Fig. 4), but the other vehicles were not in such a
situation, allowing Rg to remain under the threshold. In that
case, the global risk was not more informative than the local
risk.
The vertical dotted line represents the instant when the lead
vehicle started to perform its emergency braking manoeuvre;
it takes place 47.29 and 57.27 seconds in the scenario, for #A
and #B respectively. The global risk for veh2 almost starts to
increase immediately, until it reaches 1 at the actual collision
. The increase in Rg,2 starts to increase Rg too. In run #A,
Rg passes the 0.7 threshold when Rg,3 do so; however, in
run #B only the increase of Rg,2 is enough for Rg to pass
the threshold, as it was stable at a higher value before (in
run #B the string was slightly denser than in run #A).
Let us now consider dt , the time difference between an
instant tL at which the local risk assessment mechanism
returns a value greater than the 0.7 threshold, and an instant
tA at which the total risk assessment mechanism returns a
value greater than the same threshold. This values allows us
to compared the performance of the cooperative and non-
cooperative risk-assessment approaches in terms of direct
benefits to the driver. In run #A, we have dt = 6.91 seconds,
and in run #B dt = 7.27 seconds; more instances of dt are
given in Tab. I. We can see that over these runs, dt was
always larger than 6 seconds. This means that further than
the 5 seconds, at most, of advance warning given just by the
local perception, we can now have a total advance warning
of 11 to 13 seconds by using augmented perception.
With augmented perception, the driver of veh5 can be warned
in advance of an issue taking place further in the string
before it has the capability to become aware of it. Although
in our scenario the implementation did not include a driver
reaction affected by the risk assessment process, the advance
warning would allow veh5 to prepare in several ways: the
driver’s reaction time can be shortened by its enhanced state
of alertness, and the vehicle’s speed would likely be reduced.
Altogether, the driver would most probably be able to avoid
a rear-end crash with veh4, even without the presence of an
EEBL-like CCW system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented the design of an augmented-map-
building architecture, which we then used to compare the
performance (in terms of direct benefits for the driver) of co-
operative versus non-cooperative risk assessment approaches.
The augmented-map-building architecture is implemented
within the SiVIC-RTMaps™ framework and within a Co-
operative Systems application simulation framework that we
developed in previous research. The architecture allows sim-
ulating realistic driving scenarios thanks to its extensive en-
vironment simulation, with physics-based models of vehicles
and environmental factors such as lighting and weather,
and the 802.11p IVC simulation we developed in previous
research [9]. A simple risk assessment system was then
placed at the map-building architecture’s output. It is based
on a combination of the crash probability obtained from
the TTC, and the expected severity of the probable crash,
obtained from the EES. By combining different appropriate
risk values, we can extract the global risk as perceived by a
vehicle depending on whether it uses only local sensors or
has access to the augmented map.
A 5-vehicle string emergency braking scenario was used to
compare the risk-assessment approaches’ performance. Our
results show that the local risk-assessment system can inform
drivers that they are entering "dangerous" driving conditions
with at most 5 seconds of warning before the actual crash.
On the other hand, the augmented-map based risk-assessment
gives an additional 2 to 7 seconds of advance warning, for
a total of almost 13 seconds of warning before the crash,
in the best case scenario (for the string’s last vehicle). The
advance warning remained consistent over several runs of
the same non-repeatable scenario, with varying intervehicular
distances in each string. We argue that this additional time
would be largely sufficient for a driver faced with such an
emergency scenario to adapt their behaviour and prepare for
the incoming "braking wave"; it is likely that the driver of
the fifth vehicle would be able to avoid a crash.
However, we found that only a part of the vehicles present in
the string benefited from this increased warning. The closer
they are to the initial event, the less likely they were to
be warned with sufficient time to change their behaviour.
Although the first half of the string will not gain much from
a cooperative approach, in most cases at least half of the
string’s vehicles would have enough warning to avoid or
mitigate any further crashes.
For future work, we should focus on two axes: (1) improving
the risk-assessment system by using other, more complex
metrics; (2) test the current system on the road. Indeed,
for that latter point it is important to stress out that our
map-building architecture is not limited to simulated data;
it is transparent to the origin of input data and can be
deployed easily with data collected on actual vehicles with
real sensors.
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